As the future of Europe becomes less certain, NATO now needs a new strategic concept that places less focus on new membership, and more attention on honoring the Article 5 guarantees it has already extended. This initiative should occur together with a formal recognition that the U.S. “reset” policy with Russia, whatever its possible merits at the time, has failed and of the need for a new sustainable pan-European security architecture. As NATO prepares for the Warsaw Summit in July, it has an important opportunity to lay the groundwork for these changes.
NATO faced the first major setback to its “Open Door” policy with the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, this in the immediate aftermath of a NATO summit in Bucharest that declined to extend a Membership Action Plan to Georgia. While the immediate catalyst for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 was the prospect of a closer association between Ukraine and the European Union, the invasion had the effect of ending any serious possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. Later in 2015, Russian destabilization activities against the Baltic states and a wide range of provocative actions against other NATO members signaled a broader rejection of the Alliance’s ambition of a “Europe, whole and free.”
Meanwhile, NATO continues the charade of inexorable eastward expansion, even though it exhibits no serious intention of admitting qualified strategically relevant applicants, like Georgia. While the recent admission of Montenegro marked an important and useful step forward towards the long project of consolidating the Balkans, the addition of this lovely seaside country nestled across from Italy about 500 miles west of the eastern border of NATO does not represent a difficult decision by the Alliance. NATO has also struggled to reassure newer members that any Russian hybrid warfare they face will be met with a meaningful response. An alliance with security guarantees that suffer from any doubt or misperception is much more dangerous than no alliance at all.
At the Munich Security Conference last month, there was a pervasive sense of drift in the transatlantic community, with a wide divergence on how the Alliance should respond to these events and on the future of the alliance. The Russian intervention in Syria was, in part, a skillful way for Putin to change the narrative away from Ukraine, but this deft act should not distract the United States and Europe from the big decisions they face. The Warsaw Summit should be used to get the alliance back to the basics: collective security and territorial defense in Europe and a new stable security system for the region. While this is no new Cold War — and it is counterproductive to think in those grand historic terms and exaggerate the challenge — the alliance should recognize that at least for now, the most significant and capable threat to its core interests is a resurgent and revanchist Russia that is intent on destabilizing Europe and dividing the transatlantic community.
President Putin is certainly central to these Russian policies. He masterminded the invasion of Georgia as prime minister, saw to the annexation of Crimea, and ordered the invasion and destabilization of eastern Ukraine. He has adroitly exaggerated the overlap of United States and Russian interests in Syria, while exploiting American frustrations with Turkey, a NATO ally. He has been plain about his disdain for liberal Europe and has actively sought to build support for European right wing movements and political parties. Whether his intervention in Syria was in part intended to generate more refugees is impossible to determine, but he has demonstrated no concern for the effect of these refugees on an increasingly fragile Turkey and mainstream political leaders in Europe.
But the dynamics are larger than Putin. There is large and sustained Russian support for pushing back against NATO and its perceived infiltration of Russia’s “near abroad.” Economic factors in Russia make much of the population easy prey for any form of nationalism that blames problems on external foes, real or imagined. Russian elites, too, tend to share in the resentment of their country’s decline and decade of weakness. While Russia is a much weaker version of its former self, it is a capable nuclear-armed actor that is strong enough to resist and foil any further expansion of the transatlantic community.
This is a problem for those who believe in the transatlantic community, but some of this is self-inflicted. For too long, NATO has been permitted to continue to operate as if it were still in the “holiday from history” of the 1990s. NATO is burdened with a set of unresolved ideas at the heart of post-Cold War NATO expansion. The eastern boundaries of the alliance were never defined and the strategic identity and interests of Russia were never seriously contemplated nor allowed for. Even the name of the alliance was unchanged — a name that will always be implacably associated by Russians with the Cold War — and their defeat in it. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq temporarily postponed the need to deal with these issues, as the Alliance was repurposed for providing forces for “out of area operations.”
None of this is to say that the United States and Europe cannot cooperate with Russia where it might make sense to do so. But such cooperation should be focused on situations where Russian capabilities truly matter for the resolution of pressing international problems. If the transatlantic community was more effective at deterring, or at least not inviting, subversive Russian behavior in the first place, Russia would have fewer opportunities to create crises it later promises to try to solve in exchange for otherwise needless compromise and accommodation.
The following steps comprise an agenda for the Warsaw Summit, the preparation and messaging for which should begin immediately.
Step Up Deterrence
First, the alliance should double down on deterrence. The United States has announced a “quadrupling” of military spending on Europe, bringing the total to $3.4 billion in new operational & maintenance funding. While a welcome initiative, the relatively small size and temporary nature of the funding risk undercutting the impression of commitment it is otherwise intended to give.
Using these funds to maintain continuous rotational presence of a brigade combat team will create a new tripwire (as if one was really necessary?) but will not be viewed by Moscow as a credible form of deterrence. Depending on the geography of the rotational deployment, the brigade could actually be unnecessarily provocative. A brigade combat team does not have any obvious uniquely defensive characteristic. Russian air defense systems and ground-to-ground systems are also already being deployed to Russia’s western boundaries to minimize or negate the real utility of a NATO brigade.
Instead, the United States and NATO should invest in new permanent and explicitly defensive forces, reinvigorate and modernize their nuclear capabilities, and renew attention to theater missile defense, with an explicit focus on not just Iranian missiles, but any non-strategic missiles that could threaten the region. Notably, tactical nuclear weapons were excluded from New START and should be addressed by a new NATO defense posture.
All of this should be done with baselined budgets that mark a long-term commitment to deterrence of aggression in the region. Some of these things are already being done to different degrees. It is just a matter of advertising them correctly and giving them greater strategic purpose.
Get Real with Georgia and Reform the Membership Process
The pretense of Georgia’s alliance application should be discarded in favor of a process towards a negotiated non-member relationship that is clear and viable. Seeking security through political-military integration with the West over the past 20 years, Georgia was again rejected by the alliance when the December 2015 NATO Ministerial meeting declined to initiate with Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) and declined to permit direct accession talks.
The Alliance should use the occasion to discard the MAP process entirely — for Georgia and for all future aspirants. Defense specialists widely agree that Georgia has already accomplished more defense reforms than many other successful NATO applicants and that another intermediate step would likely be an invitation for new Russian aggression.
MAP may have been a useful tool in extracting and cajoling reforms in a permissive, uncontested security environment. But that environment is gone. All membership applications should now proceed through a negotiated bilateral process that is less bureaucratic and more transparently reflective of strategic interests of the Alliance. As part of that change, the Alliance should reframe its ‘Open Door Policy’ not as inevitable expansion, but as a highly selective tool that the Alliance will only seek to use to narrowly advance its security.
It is extremely unlikely NATO would take any steps towards the integration of Georgia into the alliance, given that Russian forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would implicate Article 5 guarantees immediately upon admission. The continued pretense that NATO might extend MAP and that it “remains committed to the Bucharest protocol” is sowing confusion, squandering scarce resources and attention, and causing needless risks. Fortunately, however, there are other ways the Alliance can engage with Georgia.
Support for Territorial Defense
NATO has many other highly effective ways it can work with non-NATO allies to advance shared interests against Russian military adventurism. U.S. and NATO support to Georgia should move away from counterinsurgency training and constabulary force development and immediately begin to focus exclusively on making the country harder for Russia to invade, occupy, or digest. NATO military assistance to countries like Georgia is unlikely to be able to deter Russian aggression. But it could easily make it a lot more expensive and risky, changing Russian decision calculus.
Anti-air and anti-armor systems, coupled with new investments in command-and-control as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for Georgia — and for Moldova, and maybe one day, Ukraine or even Belarus, and any other country in between NATO and Russia — would help create a zone of countries that were neither part of Europe or NATO nor subject to constant Russian coercion, subversion, and intrigue.
Consider it a pragmatic modern approach to the enduring strategic problem of Mitteleuropa, a fragmented region suspended between larger powers by virtue of geography, language, and culture. As it emerged from the last age of empire, Woodrow Wilson sought to re-anchor the region through self determination, a short experiment as weak states were preyed upon by more capable neighbors. A perpetual source of instability at best, Tim Snyder described it as the “Bloodlands” at its worst. Robert Kaplan, quoting Josef Pilsudski, founder of the second Polish Republic, refers to the need for an “Intermarium” group of unaffiliated democratic states between the Baltic and Black Seas.
While it is obviously desirable if these countries are also democracies, it would mark an important step towards a sustainable security system if they had a reasonable ability to defend themselves and were at least not constantly in play between larger alliances. At a minimum, this could buy time, giving Russian strategic culture an opportunity to mellow, grow beyond its post-imperial ambitions, and learn to live within the boundaries of a modern nation state.
Obviously, any such comprehensive military assistance strategy would need to be accompanied by constitutional stability, a high degree of transparency, and by civil-military and command-and-control reforms, to ensure the capabilities were responsibly managed in support of uniquely defensive postures.
Back to the Drawing Board on European Security
The alliance should use these initiatives to highlight the need for a new pan-European security architecture that is stable, sustainable, and realistic. As attractive and inspiring as many find the motto “Europe, whole and free,” NATO’s “Open Door Policy” did not ultimately provide a sufficient avenue towards achieving and retaining that goal. The only other pan-European security agreement, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), died in 2015 when Russia unilaterally withdrew.
The Warsaw Summit could be used to pose the question about what succeeds the CFE Treaty, as well as wrap the question of tactical nuclear weapons together with conventional weapons into a broader question about the balance of forces in Europe. The Alliance could also take this opportunity to investigate how collective security guarantees need to be reformed to operate in an environment of asymmetric threat and hybrid warfare.
As part of this, the Alliance could even suggest the need to rename itself. It would be foolish to diminish or discard the extraordinarily valuable political-military system of the alliance, with its value based decision-making and technical interoperability. However, NATO does not need to gratuitously aggravate Russia — and the Russian population — by continuing to impress on them their defeat. Imagine what it would be like to live in Europe, surrounded by a Warsaw Pact!
Looking Ahead
While Putin has repeatedly proven himself to be a risk taker, he takes calculated risks. Lest we blunder into new conflicts that no one intends, NATO should take this opportunity to proactively shape the agenda for a transformational Summit in Warsaw that announces bold new willingness to think about the future, while doubling down on deterrence, increasing transparency, reducing confusion and opportunities for misperception, and arming allies that are ready and willing to defend themselves.
By helping Georgia focus on its territorial defense rather than placating it with reiteration of theoretical openness to Georgian membership in the alliance, NATO would both reduce the incentive for Russia to engage in renewed aggression in the near term, as well as restore in Russian minds the sense of cohesion and solidarity within the Alliance.
Job C. Henning (@jobchenning) has worked for the Pentagon and intelligence community on European security and strategic planning. He was a co-director of the Congressional Commission the Project on National Security Reform and is a Truman Fellow and CEO of Grid Energy.
Douglas Ollivant (@DouglasOllivant), a retired Army infantry officer, is an ASU Senior Fellow in the Future of War project at New America, a managing partner of Mantid International, and a national security contributor to Al Jazeera America.
Correction: This article originally said that Montenegro is 2000 miles west of NATO’s eastern edge. The correct distance is approximately 500 miles.
clemrs 
Warlock 
A good starter for discussion. Being honest that Georgia is never joining would be a good start.
Ukraine is not mentioned but that is also going to be a difficult discussion, of course the referendum in Crimia was illegal and influenced by the Russians, but with a 80% plus ethnic Russian population, a history since independence of voting for the pro Russian candidate and heavily populated by retired Russian Navy and family, do you realistically think a free and fair UN supervised referendum might not have had the same results. Crimia is not coming back and at some point that will have to be accepted.
Ukraine is bankrupt and corrupt and how on earth it copes with either a “frozen conflict” in the East or re-integrating the provinces I don’t know.
Belarus we have to make clear we have no ambition re EU or NATO, but at the same time give them the option of leaning West to get a little independence.
The Baltics, well part of it is Ecconomics support from EU and making sure that gets to all the population, if the historic Ethnic Russian population are fully integrated EU citizens they are not a minority to be exploited. Military support needs to be there and the NATO air policing mission can be expanded to other areas, but the balance is too aggressive a posture will be counter-productive. How do you react if you are Russian and see a couple of Armoured Divisions pointing at St Petersburg, (especially if they are German!).
Distance from Podgorica to eastern NATO border (Romania-Moldova) is about 600 miles, not 2,000. Somewhat more to Crimea, but within Su-24 range from there.
I think that various NATO nations have lost confidence in American leadership. That America does not have the guts to back up its allies. That America does not live up to its words.
Its American leadership that is lacking. Can you backup your words. Can the allies be confident that America back them in times of war.
For me, when you say your going to do something with force when a line is crossed, then you dont, would that not make your allies nervous?
I had that sinking feeling when the President did not back up his words on syria. Who is going to believe you when a NATO country is threatened? I saw how the Europeans were starting to get nervous ovet American leadership.
Eisenhower encouraged Hungary to revolt, and then stood by as it was crushed. Credibility comes back. Syria was a blow to American credibility, but the red line was a horrible idea to begin with, and the loss to credibility from not going to war is less than what would occur if we went to war, fucked up the country, and then were forced to leave.
>this in the immediate aftermath of a NATO summit in Bucharest that declined to extend a Membership Action Plan to Georgia.
Sorry, you must do a better job of analysis than this. The August 2008 invasion of Georgia came in the wake of a PROMISE to Georgia and Ukraine of eventual NATO membership — a tawdry and transparent attempt at achieving “Article 5 Lite” status for both countries without all that MAP fuss (or waiting for either country to turn into the kind of stable democracy that NATO supposedly requires).
But there is another problem with this analysis, one which the authors skirt briefly around, but don’t address head-on: There is no consensus within NATO for why it exists at all in the post Cold War era, nor will there be — Old Europe wants a vehicle for out-of-area excursions (Somali pirates, anyone?), while New Europe are of necessity Article 5 fundamentalists.
The architect of containment, George Kennan, saw this never-ending urge for eastward expansion for what it was — madness.
In a 1998 interview, Kennan said:
“I think it is the beginning of a new cold war. I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake…[w]hat bothers me is how superficial and ill informed the whole Senate debate was. I was particularly bothered by the references to Russia as a country dying to attack Western Europe. Don’t people understand? Our differences in the cold war were with the Soviet Communist regime. And now we are turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history to remove that Soviet regime.”
And the inevitable result of our expand-first-think-later policy?
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
I think you are right about the divergent interests of the major European powers and Eastern Europe: Poland is always going to be far better motivated to confront the Russians than the French or Germans are, given the limitations of Russian power.
Again, maybe NATO is not the appropriate tool for dealing with Russian resurgence, given the divergent interests of its members. Perhaps the US should focus on bilateral capability building in Eastern Europe as a primary means of dealing with this security challenge.
Removed Soviet regime??? Putin, Yakunin,Shoigu,S Ivanov,V Ivanov,Sechin,Volodyn,Rogozin,Boltnikov,Kokoltsev,Patrushev etc. This is leadership of Russian Federation and they are ALL BY ONE KGB cadres! Lavrov and other group of RF leadership are ex Soviet and ex Communist Party officials so please can we stop about “blodless revolution which removed Soviet regime” ?
Ted nails the key point. European security needs to evolve beyond NATO. Should the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia be part of a European security structure? Probably…but that structure needs to shed its dependence on U.S. forces and the implicit threat of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Certainly the U.S. could enter into some agreement with the new organization, particularly to maintain the very useful NATO interoperability standards. But Europe has the population, economic, and industrial muscle to manage it’s own defense. The face of European defense needs to be European.
Is a new organisation even required? Why not build on bilateral relationships within the wider NATO alliance network to empower Eastern Europe?
“Network to empower”….
In a nutshell counts for nothing.
US Diplomats & Generals can be as friendly, jovial & encouraging as they like.
But the reality is that Europe has grown fat & docile with the US ensuring its protection.
The only chance to arrest the torpor is tough love.
And that means disengagement.
If that doesn’t encourage European powers to take the lead then at least we know where everyone stands & that Europe doesn’t & never had any interest in it’s own defence.
Misses the point. We are often our own worst enemy. As long as the U.S. is embedded within a European collective defense structure, it will be the 800-lb gorilla…we’ll insist on running the show our way, and as long as we’re supplying most of resources, everyone else will happily let us.
We’d be better off giving NATO and SHAPE an honorable retirement, letting Europe figure out a collective defense structure we’re not part of, then making an agreement to aid that organization — as an external player — under certain conditions. We don’t want to abandon Europe, but we need to be the last resort, not the first. And the same model applies in the Pacific….
Perhaps an opportunity for soft power?
Fuel has been used as a tool of coercion repeatedly in the region. A pipeline from the south could make all the difference as snow flies.
Europe would appreciate the new customer base rather than shutting down North Sea oil rigs. Crimea, Ossetia, eastern Ukraine could all look enviously across the borders as power grids hum.
Often habit becomes structure and persists beyond the point of relevance. NATO was an anti-Soviet collaboration that continues that hostile institutional bias and provokes the inevitable response. The main problem is Europe no longer supports its military preparedness and relies on the US to provide the deficit. Europe is in fact in identity crisis, with plunging birthrates, social chaos coming in the face of mass Muslim immigration, and total lack of cohesion despite the mouthings at international summits. EU is an economic partnership. Russia is adversarial in the face of NATO/EU expansion, and they have reason to deploy their historic paranoia re ‘the West’. Trump has proposed a complete overhaul of NATO with name change to reflect current situation. He will be excoriated for challenging this highly lucrative (for those most involved) and expensive (for USA) alliance and proposing a cooperative relationship with Russia to accommodate their interests in balance with our own. So long as the worldis perceived through the lens of NATO mission, thinking will propose iterations not innovation. So long as we assume Russia is the ‘enemy’, we will never get to promise land. Strength byall means, because that will lead to better relations and balancing of interests. Russia is a noble and heroic nation, a past ally, a past challenge and a potentially future cooperator in the anti-terrorist and pro-peace resolution of our differences.
A good article, however I doubt any of the conference participants will consider any of it.
– Obama on his farewell tour will ask for more money for the umpteenth time, knowing his audience doesn’t care.
– They will talk about migrants & think of imaginative ways to further assist the people smugglers of North Africa & the Middle-East.
just 30 months to go before the Russian Czar’s vanity World Cup is over & he can turn his attention to annexing the eastern third of Estonia.