The recent explosion of interest in gray zone tactics and techniques has spurred an interesting discussion of history and terminology. Writers such as Adam Elkus, writing here at War on the Rocks, have doubts about the novelty of the idea — Adam argues that the concept is “hopelessly muddled,” historically ignorant, and “internally underdetermined and weak in overall policy utility,” and that it suffers from “gaping conceptual holes,” and thus promises to “needlessly confuse” national security debates.
These critiques offer many insightful points, but I think they exaggerate the claims of gray zone analyses, and the ambitions of their authors. The issue is not whether the concept is new. In fact, it obviously is not: As I stress repeatedly in my own report on the topic and at War on the Rocks, history is full of states using things now ascribed to gray zone campaigns. Instead, these analyses — mine and dozens of others from official and unofficial sources alike — are merely trying to understand recent actions by U.S. rivals in coherent terms.
The issue of analytical aspirations is a bit obscure, but it is central to the critiques and demands a quick word. Elkus refers repeatedly to “Mazarr’s conception” of gray zone conflict, seeming to imply that my report aimed to produce an original theory of war. It did not. For one thing, the term gray zone has been used by dozens of governments and scholars for some years now. Some analyses (such as official NATO reports) prefer the term hybrid; others favor “measures short of war.” But nobody I know of working this issue is trying to overturn historical understanding, or thinks they have devised a brilliant new theory. They are merely trying to get a handle on what is going on, and believe that some encompassing category — gray, hybrid, or otherwise — can help us do it.
When B.J. Armstrong, also writing at War on the Rocks, quotes the historian of realpolitik John Bew to the effect that “effective foreign policy is better served by a more textured analysis — a sense of patterns, interactions, and connections — than by new theories,” I do not see how this diminishes the value of gray zone analyses, which are attempting to do precisely that. Their goal is to assess current patterns, interactions, and connections with an eye to informing U.S. and allied strategy.
Armstrong urges that the United States should not “disregard the ideas and concepts previous generations have built” — and I could not agree more. My own report goes into some depth on decades- and centuries-old concepts of unconventional and asymmetric approaches, noting for example that fifth-column-style political disruption has been a feature of rivalry for millennia. Such historical perspective, though, does not deny that Russia, China and others are using measures short of war today in coherent and effective ways.
In his second article on the topic, Elkus summarizes what seems to be his main objection:
[T]he gray zone concept merely puts a new spin on older and more well-understood ideas from political science, military history, and strategic theory about how actors pursue strategic objectives under constraint.
If such a thing helps decision-makers to understand current patterns of behavior, I frankly don’t see the problem. That’s precisely what these analyses are trying to do: Gather together well-known ideas into a coherent portrait of current events.
The question should not be about terminology or novelty. It should be whether there is an identifiable pattern of behavior that threatens U.S. and allied interests. Are Russia, China, probably Iran, and perhaps others using holistic campaigns fashioned from a wide range of military, political, informational, and economic tools to achieve revisionist goals while staying under the threshold of major war? Are the resulting campaigns more determined, coherent, and coordinated than run-of-the-mill diplomacy, enough so that they ought to be considered as a specific danger?
If the answer to all of these questions is yes — and I think there is a good case to be made for that — then the United States and its allies confront a specific form of statecraft; not new, in all its characteristics, but real and relevant. And most observers who have looked at the problem tend to agree that the United States is ill-prepared for such tactics, in part because it simply has not thought of them as a coherent approach worthy of a tailored response.
Notwithstanding theoretical determinacy or the deep history of Russian and Chinese grand strategy, U.S. civilian and military leaders seem convinced, based on the evidence of their daily interaction with Russian and Chinese activities, that these countries are using threshold-busting approaches to achieve revisionist effects short of war. If so, the United States needs to take them seriously and formulate meaningful responses.
To be clear, the case for gray zone campaigns is a provisional judgment. Recent actions by Russia and China could represent a much looser, more ad-hoc seizing of apparent opportunities. Leaders in both countries might have little conscious sense of conducting anything like a gray zone, threshold-straddling, measures-short-of-war campaign. An important recent analysis of the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine,” for example, suggests that the West should not read too much into its implications for Russian strategy. In my report, I look at various categories of evidence — including patterns of behavior and doctrinal statements — and conclude that there is reason to believe that recent hints do imply self-conscious strategies. But the case, I fully admit, remains inconclusive.
There is a certain truth to the fact that very little in world politics — or the assessment of it — is really new. Yet from time to time, patterns do emerge that — while their specific elements may be antique — reflect important and identifiable mixtures of interests, tactics, and intentions that become characteristic of a particular moment. Sometimes these patters pose a particular danger because they reflect unexpected and unplanned-for concepts: combined-arms blitzkrieg in 1939, insurgency in the 1950s and 1960s, hybrid war in 2006. At such times, terms and concepts can be helpful to understanding what is going on. They can point us to significant trends, make clear the need for analysis, and hint at the right responses — and do so by building on, rather than ignoring or replacing, the many important ideas that have gone before.
Michael J. Mazarr is the acting director of RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program, and a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
Photo credit: Day Donaldson (adapted by WOTR)
Mikhail Pronko 
hjbergman 
Good summary of the pro-gray-zone-vocabulary position.
Errata: final paragraph, fourth line, change “patters” to “patterns”.
Is Elkus trying to deliberately counter measure the thought of where you’re going with it? The only logical next stop is the World War III debate obviously. Tell you what why not have Elkus head on over to the “Council on Foreign Relations” website and have him check out their “Conflict Tracker”. I’m sure once he does he’ll plainly understand exactly what you mean by “gray zone conflict” and yes, I agree with you and yes there is a current “World Wide War” raging whether people like Elkus like it or not. That’s not just an opinion, but pure fact.
The current “hybrid” tactics can be most clearly described as a skilful regurgitation of past experience applied to modern territorial issues. the concept of protecting one’s compatriots abroad is not a new one, yet Russia managed to twist existing international law and its own history to present the West with a legal basis for its actions, albeit a deeply flawed one.
There is no better place to explore the more textured analysis of modern strategy than “War on the Rocks”. The on-going dialog among Michael Mazarr, Adam Elkus and B.J. Armstrong regarding the ‘gray zone’ provides plenty of food for thought.
In Mr. Mazarr’s most recent contribution in his article, “The Strange Debates of Strategy”, he provides a well-articulated defense for his view that the concept of the ‘gray zone’ provides a useful framework for analyzing current events.
He is absolutely correct when he asserts that the goal of ‘gray zone analyses’ “is to assess current patterns, interactions, and connections with an eye to informing U.S. and allied strategy”. Labels, like ‘gray zone’, only have value in the context of the question they are supposed to help answer.
However, it is not clear how U.S. and allied strategy is actually ‘informed’ by this analysis, as opposed to old fashioned geopolitical analysis. In fact, ‘gray zone’ analyses seem to be more about cataloguing tactics than evaluating strategy. It might help to have some examples to understand how they do more.
For example, Mr. Mazarr poses the question,
“Are Russia, China, probably Iran, and perhaps others using holistic campaigns fashioned from a wide range of military, political, informational, and economic tools to achieve revisionist goals while staying under the threshold of major war?”
It’s an interesting question, but it is not clear how ‘gray zone’ analysis provides a better answer than traditional analyses. Nor is it clear how ‘gray zone’ analysis will yield better policy decisions.
Russia has few ‘natural’ borders and has been invaded from the east and west. We might expect the Russians to be very interested in having neighbors that are not hostile, if not friendly. Unfortunately for Ukraine, Ukraine has been part of the Russian ‘sphere’ for centuries, and Russia has, and will always have, a keen interest in what happens there. (To paraphrase Porfirio Diaz’s famous quip about the sad fate of Mexico, “Poor Ukraine. So far from God, and so close to Russia.”)
Our policy leaders, naturally, have a different view than Moscow’s. We are very happy to surround Russia with anti-Russian neighbors, going so far as to consider inviting Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO. We had no problem supporting an uprising that ousted the democratically elected, pro-Russia president of Ukraine. Our assistant secretary of state visited the protestors to encourage them. She was also caught on tape discussing with the US ambassador potential candidates for a new government. Should we believe that the US provided no additional support to the ‘democratic’ protestors?
The only surprise is our surprise that Russian leaders might take a dim view of our interference in their ‘sphere’ and that they were prepared to take action to protect what they view as their vital, national interests. Did we have no idea that Moscow might be concerned about the future of their naval base in Crimea with a hostile government in Kiev? The fact that the Russians are willing to limit their actions to avoid engaging western powers in a direct military conflict seems to demonstrate a
fairly sound analysis of the balance of power in the region.
The interesting question is not whether Russian leaders are “using holistic campaigns fashioned from a wide range of military, political, informational, and economic tools’ to achieve their nationalist goals. It is how far Russia is willing to push, and where will we push back.
From a geopolitical perspective, it is understandable that Russia would annex Crimea. It is also understandable that they would want the eastern portion of Ukraine to be a friendly zone along its border. But are they willing to go further to overthrow the ‘pro-western’ regime in Kiev (as we were willing to support the overthrow of the pro-Russian regime)? Or expand in the Baltics? Do Russians believe that their interests go that far? Or that they have the power to expand that far? Or understanding how and when western powers will react?
We can discuss and disagree as to Russia’s intent and their evaluation of western strategy. But it’s not clear how the label ‘gray zone’ advances our understanding of Russian intent or how to respond to it. At best, it describes a well-known package of tactics that they use and that we have used.
While the label ‘gray zone’ seems to distract from analysis rather than ‘inform’ it, the label that really intrigues me is Mr. Mazarr’s reference to ‘revisionist’ goals of Russia, China and Iran. I have seen the term ‘revisionist; used in recent policy/strategy essays, and I have no idea what purpose is served in labeling their goals as ‘revisionist’ instead of, say, ‘nationalist’?
As I mentioned earlier, a label is only important in context of the question that it answers. And my suspicion is that ‘revisionist’ is meant to give their goals a sinister connotation, where simply calling them ‘nationalist’ would make their goals comparable to ours, from an analytical perspective, though in opposition to ours.
After all, we, too, have a long history of using ‘holistic campaigns fashioned from a wide range of military, political, informational, and economic tools to achieve’ our goals. We have had no problem supporting dictators, overthrowing democratically elected governments, using our economic power, disseminating false information, using military force and covert subversion, assassinating opposition leaders. We do this to advance our national interest (or, at least, some version of it). Is this ‘revisionist’, or simply good realpolitik?
I do not suggest that we should ignore our national interest (though I think there should be more discussion as to what that is). But, from an analytical perspective, if the US can exert its influence in the western hemisphere, why would we not expect Russia at least to try to do the same in eastern Europe? Or China in the South China Sea? Or Iran in the Middle East? If we were in their shoes, what might we do? What have we done? Their actions might be counter to our interests, but why would we expect otherwise. We might have a national interest in pushing back against their interests. Fair enough. But that does not make their interests less legitimate from their national perspective and deserving of more ‘informed’ analysis than labeling them ‘revisionist’.
The problem with the labels ‘gray zone’ and ‘revisionist’ is that they suggest that our adversaries or, rather, semi-adversaries, are doing something very different from what we do and cannot be understood in simple terms that we use to describe our own actions. Rather than ‘informing’ our analysis, they tend to muddy it.