Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s recent memo to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus detailed cuts to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in order to pay for a collection of new and legacy platforms and payloads. The memo has drawn wide interest and generated much speculation about the future of the LCS. Despite this cut, LCS opponents should not yet be too jubilant. Secretary Carter expressed satisfaction with the LCS in his memo, and the program continues forward with a robust 40 units as opposed to the planned 52.
In 2014, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel ordered a limited “transformation” of the LCS from a ship with most of its capabilities in dedicated mission modules to a more heavily armed frigate with its warfighting capacity permanently installed. Much more can be done in a relatively inexpensive manner to make the ship more lethal, especially through the addition of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Such an update to the LCS obviates the need for a $1-billion large traditional frigate or a mass of short-range, 1,000-ton corvettes without helicopter facilities. The LCS is frequently criticized as “unsurvivable” in comparison with larger ships. However, even in its baseline form, it possesses a more robust defense against anti-ship cruise missiles than the now retired Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates did in their final configuration.
The Carter memo essentially instructs the U.S. Navy to rapidly modernize its fleet escort air defense capability in order to counter modern anti-ship cruise missiles, add greater strike capabilities to the Virginia-class submarines, and purchase more carrier aircraft. The deficiencies in advanced offensive and defensive weapons and aircraft described in the memo are primarily in the major surface combatant force and naval aviation. The LCS program itself is not criticized; only the number of ships to be produced is reduced. To his credit, Secretary Carter describes the LCS as “a far more modern and capable ship than the patrol coastal ships, minesweepers (actually mine countermeasures ships), and frigates that they replace.” His targeting of the LCS alone to fund the improvements in offensive and defensive capabilities required in the memo could, however, paint a larger bullseye on the program and encourages more opposition in Congress and the defense community to the 40 remaining ships.
The United States Navy needs a variety of capabilities to be effective as a component of a modern joint force. The slippage in the range and lethality of carrier aircraft, the offensive and defensive components of surface ships, and the strike attributes of the submarine force did not happen during the tenure of the present Navy secretary, or even during that of his predecessor. These trends have been ongoing since 1991, when the United States essentially decided that all future conflicts would be joint and combined air–ground task force operations around the Eurasian littoral within the range of land-based aviation. U.S. naval forces must be rebalanced to meet new threats. The Carter memo describes this effort. Its exclusive focus on cuts to the LCS force, however, may further endanger this vitally needed program, and its forced choice of only one LCS variant by 2019 could seriously impact the losing shipyard. The U.S. Navy cannot field a fleet of only high-capability ships. LCS still represents the best and most economical choice to produce a large number of lower-capability warships needed for escort and low threat area missions.
Steven Wills is a retired surface warfare officer who spent most of his operational career in small combatants including frigates, mine countermeasures ships and patrol coastals. He is a PhD candidate in Military History at Ohio University, Athens, OH. His forthcoming dissertation is entitled, “Replacing the Maritime Strategy, The Change in U.S. Naval Strategy from 1989-1994.”
As a former Navy Officer (1100) who served on DE’s, DD’s, and on a Destroyer Squadron Staff, I agree that DE Escorts type vessels with an ASWcapability are a sorely needed component of our force structure — especially given the acquisition of so many Electrical-Deisal submarines by our potential opponeness around the world.
Increasing the number of other (higher capability) ship types in the fleet should occur, but without further decreasing the planned number of Escort Type ships being provided.
To say that LCS “possesses a more robust defense against anti-ship cruise missiles than the now retired Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates did in their final configuration.” is misleading, and more than a bit disingenuous. The Perry, with the MK-13 was more than capable of defending itself against anti-ship missiles. When those mounts were removed as a maintenance cost reduction, the intent was to replace them with a RAM system similar to what the LCS has. That never happened as the class was accelerated into retirement by budget constraints. The indefinite delay/reset of the MCM package for LCS means that it is not replacing the mine countermeasures ships in the foreseeable future. As Milwaukee’s recent casualty indicates, the ships are less than reliable, and the minimal manning still presents maintenance and damage control liabilities that would degrade the platform’s abilities in combat. As a “show the flag to 3rd world navies” platform, the LCS is fine. Beyond that, it is pretty much just a slightly higher speed target for every submarine and aircraft in the world.
The MK 92 FCS system and its associated SM-1MR was outdated by the late 1990’s and correctly removed from the Perry’s starting in 2003. As an FFG CSO, I can attest to its problems with more modern weapons. The Australians tried a Perry VLS conversion, but such an effort in the USN was deemed not cost effective given the short remaining life of the class. Why is a comparison between the FFG (post MK13) and LCS “misleading?” The RAM/SeaRAM has more engagements than the BLK1B CIWS.
Comparing the weapons on an old and stripped-down frigate to a brand new design is disingenuous. It doesn’t matter why we removed the Mk 13s from the FFGs, the point is that the Perry class was below spec, and thus not a proper comparison for a new ship.
Even more to the point, whether the LCS/FF will have more or less air defense than a Perry is irrelevant: the important question is whether they will have enough for tomorrow’s war, not yesterday’s threats.
The Perry’s SM-1MR and CAS/Stir system has not been state of the art since the early 1990’s. LCS is not in the business of air defense. The Perry’s were not “below spec”; when their primary weapon system became antiquated they should have been retired. Instead, they remained for low end missions which is exactly the role envisioned for the LCS. Putting a brace of ASCM’s aboard and making the ship a useful ASUW platform is just added value.
LCS is an adequate replacement for the PCs and MCMs, but it is not an adequate FF in the escort mode due to its lack of area defense and lack of range. It is certainly not an acceptable frigate escort for a carrier strike group and it provides very low end protection for a logistics or amphibious group. The Navy got into this bind when it made the leap from PC/MCM replacement and added FFG which was never the intent of the LCS original concept. Was the escort role ever a serious part of the CONOPS?
Escort role was not a serious CONOPS desire until the last 2-3 years. Unlike the Cold War where the Perry’s filled a gap in immediate area air defense, the present surface fleet has a uniform AEGIS capability far above that of the Cold War fleet. In such an environment there is no need for a 5400 ton “frigate” in the US OOB. There is also no “Reforger” mission for a potential US frigate to protect, although intel later revealed that the Soviets were intent on protecting SSBN bastions before any other mission and North Atlantic convoys were 4th on the priority list.
The LCS is capable platform for replacing those ships it was designed to replace. It does offer some new capabilities. The problem is in the numbers.
The LCS is NOT a warship. It is a glorified coast guard cutter.
Even at a reduced 40 ships, we will send 20+ billion dollars on a platform that cannot operate in a wartime, contested environment without cruiser or destroyer provided air cover. This is unacceptable in both dollars and limitations incurred by the totality of the fleet.
With a 300 ship Navy, we need robust platforms – platforms that can wage war on the enemy. Until these ships can defend themselves, we can’t afford them.
To preempt anyone who will say that Sea Ram is adequate for LCS to defend itself, think again.
Until you push aggressor aircraft outside of the within visual range bubble, you will be a perpetual target of opportunity.
Do you know anything about the threat or SeaRam’s capabilities? Like the PC’s, MCM’s and the post 2003 Perry’s, LCS is not a dedicated air defense ship. The USN cannot be an entire high end fleet. There must be some low end warships.
40 of them? 20 billion dollars? How many ships are they replacing with LCS?
What’s the range of Sea Ram? How far can you see a 400 foot ship from 10,000 with the Mark I eyeball?
$20 billion will buy you perhaps 10 European-style large frigates that are nothing but 1/2 the capability of the DDG 51 at 2/3 the price of such a ship. Hardly a bargain. The baseline 0 $479 million a copy LCS is the cheapest warship one can get that has a full helo facility and basic combat systems (gun and point defense missile). SeaRam is only a point defense weapon, but has double the number of engagements as the BK1B CIWS.
The person writing this article is frankly deluded about what the intended role of the LCS was supposed to be.
Littoral Combat Ships were meant (ORIGINALLY) to be light, fast, cheap and able to tangle in the shallows. They were meant to deal with Iranian missile boat swarms, not aircraft and other warships.
Along the way, shipbuilders talked them into adding so much shit onto the design that calling it a “littoral” platform was ridiculous. Than, they decided to up-gun to a frigate, seeing as how it was the same size.
The LCS is a flawed pile of junk. Build a real frigate, a real corvette, and a real patrol boat. It may cost more up front, but this program will suck the navy dry if we continue to mess with it.
Do you know anything about the LCS or are you just repeating what you have read elsewhere?
I’m wondering how much you know about the LCS.
Where do you envision being able to operate the LCS in a war with China? What do you envision the LCS doing?
I see it either operating within 30-40 miles of an Arleigh Burke or Ticonderoga or within air cover of a friendly nation. Most likely, I see it patrolling the waters immediately around said friendly nation – to the tune of 20 billion.
Of course, it could patrol the waters of Africa for pirates – can’t think of anything better to spend 20 billion on. Just think, we can afford our friends a more robust coast guard force than we do ourselves.
30% of the world now boast extensive A2AD systems that are a threat to even a well-protected CSG. The US needs a ship that can conduct low threat missions such as counter-piracy, military cooperation, patrol and mine hunting. Many nations on the Eurasian littoral and especially on both African coasts have no navy or coast guard. Operating with Expeditionary fast transports, other low end ships, LCS can provide the right sized US military footprint as opposed to wasting a DDG on counter piracy. Put 8 ASCM’s aboard and LCS becomes a credible flotilla combatant.
Do a search and see how much I have written about LCS.
I have no major problem with the LCS as a platform, save the cost to provide for a 50 knots capapabiliy versus 35-40 knots. My problem under the current configuration is the number purchased, given the cost. Twenty or less ships could have fulfilled the legacy rolls they were intended to replace and still add a greater numbers presence.
This ship was originally intended to be a low cost platform that fulfilled several legacy rolls along with a more robust littoral capacity. Unfortunately, like many projects in the military, development creep results in added capabilities that balloon cost but offer minimal, war fighting benefit.
At this point, given the expense of the program and the percentage of the fleet the LCS will represent, it must have the capability that approaches a modern frigate.
Adding an anti-ship component is a step in the right direction. To get the worth out of a 40 LCS buy, the LCS has to have a small, vertical launch component. Sixteen to thirty-two ESSM would allow LCS a much greater freedom of movement in a denied environment.
Lastly, although not a deal breaker, I can’t imagine not leveraging the LCS as a component of the Navy’s Aegis system. Situational awareness is everything in wartime. Why not have 40 ships in your fleet contributing to a realtime mosaic of the battle space?
Singapore has the Formidable class frigates and will have an Independence class LCS (not USN version).
Malaysia will have a new light frigate.
Indonesia as well.
All these frigates/LCSes are so much better than the modular LCS of the USNs.
Enough said.
The US is not building a European style “frigate” (heavy or light) in LCS. Singapore and Malaysia’s “frigates” are those nation’s equivalents of the US DDG 51 in that they represent those nation’s most capable warships. The US already has a mass of very capable DDG 51’s and needs a large number of less capable ships for other tasks. Just because a ship looks like another does not mean it has the same national purpose. Yours is an apples to oranges comparison.