We are trying something a little new with our podcast series. Segments! And music! In the first segment of our new podcast, Ryan Evans sits down with Claude Berube to talk about his new novel, Syren’s Song. Ryan then joins Gen. Bob Scales to talk about his recent trip to Europe where he looked at the ability of U.S. and European forces to fight Russia in the event of a war. Gen. Scales expands on some of the concerns he expressed in the Wall Street Journal.
Happy listening!
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Ryan Evans 
The music was ok, but better to leave it out.
I’m guessing the music was inspired by the dramatic ‘breaking news’ intros of the 1950s lol.
Thanks for the feedback, Dan.
Really interesting interview with the General. I think his take on the pivot is a pretty weak, anecdotal evidence of PLA generals being astonished doesn’t really counter the output of structural realism. Obviously, we are in the midst of Sino-US strategic competition, and without an adequate rebalance of US forces to the WPA there is a solid chance of a significant weakening of the US alliance structure. The attitudes of the PLA generals don’t really change this metric. I think the pivot runs against the General’s implied objective here to stimulate US commitment to Europe.
Obviously the Russians have demonstrated an intent to use armed force to increase their borders. But generally the long term nature of the Russian threat is significantly less than Chinese potential.
Additionally, I think the General is overstating the technological capabilities. Should we really be surprised that the Russian army is capable of massed artillery? Really? Its also disingenuous to say the US Army hasn’t faced this threat since WW2 or Korea, it spent most of the Cold War obsessing over a conflict with a military with the ability to concentrate fires to a degree the current Russian military can only dream of. That’s what Air/Land battle was all about.
I also think he’s overstating Russian technological capability; using ‘drones’ to spot for artillery fire is something the US navy was doing in the 80’s. Integrating that kind of information into a coherent picture of the battle space imposes a significant c4 burden, and I have not read any direct evidence of the level of force integration achieved by the US army in the mid 90’s, let alone OIF. Until we do, I wouldn’t be assuming those levels of capability. Yes, Russian A2/AD capabilities are significant, but so is western air power and SEAD/DEAD.
Honestly, when I hear analysis like this which blatantly misses key historical episodes or capabilities, its hard not to assume there is a political agenda at work.