Is independent long-range strike a failure? That’s what T.X. Hammes would have us think. He uses time-worn arguments to claim that the U.S. Air Force’s plan to build the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) is a bad idea and that the money would be better spent elsewhere. Hammes’ argument suffers from many of the same flaws of others who offer impassioned critiques of airpower: namely, poor understanding of airpower theory and practice, a reliance on straw men, and selection bias. In short, we suggest that the LRS-B and the long-range strike mission remain critical to the nation’s national security.
Airpower Theory
The argument that long-range strike (also called strategic bombing) is little more than a disproven theory stems from a fixation by critics on the early work of Giulio Douhet, an airpower theorist who was writing during the early days of manned flight (1921) about the possibility of airpower playing a pivotal role in warfare. While it is true that some of Douhet’s contemporaries, including American Army Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, believed in the ability of airpower to end wars, airpower has since evolved in both theory and practice. Modern airmen have continued to incorporate experience into their thinking on the role of airpower in war. Using the writings of Douhet and Mitchell to criticize the role of modern airpower is akin to an airman using the writings of Maurice de Saxe (1757) to criticize modern land warfare.
While Hammes correctly mentions some of airpower’s successes, he sets up a straw man to then dismiss the impact of airpower when he suggests that airpower fails if it does not win wars independent of land and sea capabilities. In offering his own cases of airpower’s failure to be decisive (Lebanon-1982, Syria-1986, Sudan-1998, etc.), Hammes falls into the selection bias trap by selecting cases based on the dependent variable: conflicts in which airpower played a visible role. Not only does he dismiss all cases where airpower may have deterred a conflict, but he also dismisses cases that disprove his assertions.
These include World War II (particularly how it ended in the Pacific), Operation Opera (Israeli), and Operation Odyssey Dawn (NATO). He also describes Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) as an airpower failure, yet the most successful period of the operation was during its early days when a small ground contingent relied on airpower to destroy large parts of opposition forces. His most grievous mistake involves his misuse of terms. Long-range strike is a mission, not a theory. In other words, the U.S. Air Force conducts long-range strike missions against targets in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere regularly. To suggest it is a theory, rather than something we do with great frequency, is incorrect. It is a mission the United States must continue to be prepared to carry out for the foreseeable future. It is also one that is uniquely suited to the bomber the Air Force will build.
Bombers have some unique characteristics that aren’t usually talked about. While they do have long range and flexibility, there are some not so traditional elements that make bombers uniquely well suited for the long-range strike mission.
Point of Origin
The point of origin for a strike mission matters. American bombers launching from American soil are not bound by the restrictions placed on aircraft launching from foreign airfields. If the United States wants to strike a target in country X when launching from country Y, it is necessary to get country Y’s approval of the mission. This is a constraint frequently placed on American aircraft, but seldom relayed to the American public. Bombers launched from the United States are not subject to this constraint, and thus remain one of the most flexible capabilities in America’s arsenal.
Magazine Depth
The Navy provides another sovereign launch point — from international waters — for an American strike. Unfortunately, carrier based aircraft are short-legged (less than 1,000 nautical mile range) and cruise missiles are expensive and rapidly depleted. Contrary to Hammes’ argument that the United States will have plenty of cruise missiles if we just avoid buying a new bomber, the simple fact is, cruise missiles must be launched from expensive platforms too. Whether it be ships, submarines, or bombers, the cost of a cruise missile is not the only expense involved. As Air Force and Navy planners have discovered, one-way cruise missiles are an expensive way to strike a target. Cruise missiles also have limited capacity to strike hardened or mobile targets. Bombers provide effective deep strike capability, day after day. Operation Odyssey Dawn is a good example of the magazine-depth challenge: Given its persistent presence, naval vessels launched TLAMs to begin the campaign but were essentially out of Schlitz after the first night. Bombers flying from the United States or European bases were able to fly strike missions continuously, delivering weapons that are about one-tenth the cost of a cruise missile.
Manned vs. Unmanned
The Air Force is regularly castigated for not being forward thinking in its adoption of the ever-increasing capabilities of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). The idea is that the Air Force, which is led by pilots, is loath to make the move to drones due to machismo and perceived loss of prestige. Nothing could be further from the truth, as evidenced by the large number of RPAs being acquired (more RPAs than manned aircraft) and RPA pilots being trained today. The Air Force has made the switch to RPAs where appropriate, but it does not always make sense, especially when America’s adversaries are intent on taking away the ability to control them from a distance through a range of cyber-attacks and jamming capabilities. Each mission has to be looked at closely to ensure the risks to mission success are acceptable — for the foreseeable future, a mix of manned and remotely-piloted systems provides flexibility, resilience, and effectiveness.
Stealth
Another important component of American airpower is stealth, which is frequently misunderstood. Tactical stealth is the combination of technology and tactics that allow the striker to survive in a contested environment and successfully conduct a strike. This means aircraft like the F-22, which is stealthy and fast, have the “first look, first shot, first kill.” This provides the attacker a distinct advantage over an adversary unaware of the striker’s presence.
Strategic stealth is also a combination of stealth technology and tactics, but it doesn’t stop there. Strategic stealth uses the technology to develop a stealth methodology for achieving a strategic effect. The stealth methodology seeks to take away the enemy’s ability to detect offensive actions. Domestic basing, which makes it harder for an adversary to predict a strike, is one important feature of this methodology. Attack from a stealth aircraft can also defeat an adversary’s air defenses, enabling non-stealthy aircraft to penetrate an adversary’s airspace. Aircraft design and operational art are important components of the methodology. The bottom line is that the United States has developed a methodology of aerial warfare that provides a unique capability — one that our adversaries fear, and is proven to shape their behavior.
Deterrence
Together these characteristics combine to make airpower and the long-range strike mission (performed by bombers) a uniquely significant capability in the American arsenal. The all-too-often neglected role of airpower in shaping adversary behavior is probably its most significant capability –– deterrence. The ability to create fear in the minds of America’s adversaries is the key aspect of deterrence. While this was evident during the Cold War, recognition of airpower’s role has been lost in recent years. Nevertheless, this concept was on full display March 28, 2013 when the Air Force sent two B-2 bombers in a show of force over South Korea to remind North Korea of U.S. long-range strike capability.
While the term “deterrence” is frequently used in conjunction with nuclear weapons, conventional capability — employed from a stealth bomber — is also an important weapon in America’s deterrence arsenal.
Conclusion
What is evident in the airpower critiques of land or sea power zealots is that their own preferred form of warfare (land or sea) could not pass the same test that airpower is expected to pass with a perfect score. Airmen can easily call into question the need for an Army given the long and arguably less-than-successful conduct of ground-centric campaigns in Asia (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq). They might also call into question the need for the Navy to have an army (Marines), which has its own air force. Given the limited global threat to shipping, it would be easy to question the need to spend $140-150 billion each year on naval assets whose primary mission is patrolling the sea lines of commerce and communication.
In truth, however, this sort of non-productive inter-service bickering substitutes mediocre fiscal arguments for more strategic questions that deserve the attention of our best and brightest thinkers. How do we most effectively provide joint capabilities to the nation? How do we most effectively deter adversaries? Where is military power most and least appropriate for achieving national security objectives? If we can address these questions, we will better understand which specific capabilities and platforms are most needed in an uncertain and dangerous future.
Colonel Robert Spalding, PhD (USAF) was an Air Force Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and flew the B-2 bomber. Dr. Adam Lowther was a petty officer in the U.S. Navy and serves as a research professor at the Air Force Research Institute.
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strategicservice 
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Herman Moore 
Daniel Hodges 
James B. 
bobbymike 
Lars Hansen 
Over the past year, at least, we have witnessed one article after another, generally penned by a Ground Forces type bemoaning the share of the budget going to our Military’s Aviation activities, disguised in attacks on their strategic effectiveness. These articles, which have no basis in actual fact, are a result of the “unfortunate” downsizing of the American Ground Forces as they withdraw from two (more recent) additional strategic failures – first in Iraq and soon to be demonstrated in Afghanistan. The ground forces, and their advocates, dominated the military scene (budgets and otherwise) during the Bush and the Obama Administration until recently. Strategic failures results in a loss of control and influence.
The ground forces, instead of looking at their self caused failures are striving to attack the other military activates in this country as ineffective – because they have not fought (or been responsible for) losing conflicts, because they have not been involved heavily in the process that accompanied those strategic debacles, etc. Instead of wasting their efforts on such foolish ventures, characterized by the referenced Hammes penned article, the ground forces would do better to admit their failures, to look at the insightful and successful assessments and corrective activities developed and implemented by excellent, strategic and tactical thinkers such as Mathew Ridgeway and Colin Powell and the others involved in those resurrections of the Army. They would do well to understand what General Eisenhower understood, and reform themselves accordingly.
We need leaders in the ground forces who have the courage of General George Decker when, at the cost of his career, told President Kennedy the U.S. would lose in Vietnam. We need ground forces generals and advocates that cease proclaiming the value of Maxwell Taylor’s Doctrine of Flexible Response (whether they realize it or not) which has led the American ground forces into one strategic debacle after another as they attempted to act as occupying heavily armed police attempting to subdue one nationalistic movement after another whose political, social, or economic behavior with which the U.S. disagreed.
Ground forces advocates need to cease wasting time penning nonsense and historically inaccurate articles, effectively blaming others for their failures, and instead begin converting the ground forces back into the Colin Powell led model, to develop politically courageous leaders who will take the stances of Generals Ridgeway and Decker when asked to intervene in a situation where strategic failure awaits us, to develop and implement a strong Light Footprint capability of Special Forces and Ranger or light infantry Battalions for use in appropriate interventions at low cost and risk to the U.S., to recognize that it is time to move over two-thirds of the Marine Corps Division and aviation units to the Army (where after all they have served for most of the past 65 years) and leave only 9 or 10 battalions behind under Navy Command for the miniscule sea based (temporary) insertions they are effective at – but which will rarely occur.
That is the type of change the U.S. military needs, not a change in the very effective structure of of Air Power and Naval components which have secured their part of the strategic spectrum without any party being capable of challenging that domination. As Sun Tzu noted, the great Generals succeed without having to fight. It is not a sign of strategic success (or importance or value) when one has to fight to dominate a strategic spectrum. The U.S. Army was successful during the Cold War when its size and structure held the Soviet forces at bay without needing to engage in actual combat operations. And, during combat operations, it preformed brilliantly during the First Gulf War. It has also succeeded, rather quietly, in the Philippines and elsewhere using Special Forces Light Footprints and when intervening and rapidly withdrawing after the intervention secured it goals — that did not involve occupation of a land. It is time for them to once against implement and sustain that model of operations, and stop complaining about Air Power
It’s amazing to me how air power advocates never fail to accuse ground force commanders and advocates of hubris, and then immediately turn around and declare that U.S. air dominance is unassailable. I hope for all our sakes we never have to find out how wrong you are.
We will find out whether or not our airpower is assailable as soon as someone has the courage to assail it again. Meanwhile, there isn’t any doubt at all that our ground power is assailable – it was assailed every day for years in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Well written response – I agree that a monumental shift in the thinking of the U.S. Military is long overdue. If the Pentagon does not want to budge – It is time that the present or New President starts to set the ground rules – as was done during WWII.
There has been and chances are always will be a fiscal jealousy amongst the three branches of the military. Each presents viable (although innately biased) arguments as to why they should receive their share of the defense budget.
After reading *In Defense of the Long-Range Strike Bomber, I would submit one question…Is the Air Force working on stealthy cruise missiles? Were they to exist and despite being one-way, They would take out certain casualty risks without degrading strike capabilities. and at a relatively low R&D cost
Thank you.
Colonel Spalding,
You insist that long-range strike is a mission, not a theory, but you stick to the long-time airpower orthodoxy, rather than critically evaluating costs and benefits as part of a combined strategy.
You are correct that the Navy is really expensive, and it pains me that they cannot manage to buy an economical vessel for low-intensity conflict, but warships can get much closer to occupying territory and providing credible deterrence than aircraft can. The two B-2s that “deterred” North Korea: did the North Koreans see them, read about them on the news, or are we not sure whether they even noticed?
Addressing the nation’s national security needs in an effects-based manner would be great, and it would be a first. America has a long tradition of winning wars though attrition, although lately the overmatch has been so great that it is mistaken for operational or strategic thought.
If American intelligence would read a few more books on foreign cultures and spend less time counting tanks, we would need to attack a lot fewer targets to get our message across. It would also (sorry Colonel) probably result in much more money going into low-tech solutions–language training, foreign engagement, low-end military capabilities–and much less into technological solutions like the LRS-B program and the Air Force in general.
More Butter, less bombs. How much military First strike triad components do we need, that would feed some starving family in Kansas or Tennessee?
Jim Sullivan
Military History enthusiast
I wonder, do people who actually post such drivel, less guns, feed a starving child, understand how stupid they sound or do they believe themselves clever?
As a percentage of total government spending, defense has been massively shrinking from over 70% of the federal budget to just over 15% today WITH OCO spending included (the base budget is around 12%)
It has been replaced by SPENDING ON DOMESTIC PROGRAMS like welfare, food, stamps, Medicaid (healthcare for the poor) and on and on.
In America can we ask people to provide for themselves and their families or should we all expect cradle to grave complete care handed to us by some bureaucrat in DC?
National governments provide for the common defense it is not there to make sure your kids have food or clean underwear.
No peace and security, no prosperity or welfare.