3 thoughts on “POLL: If Russia tries to seize Crimea, what should the U.S. do?”
There are two options that I’ve thought about that no one seems to have brought up on this issue. One is the missile defense shield that the US tried setting up in Poland recently, but gave up on after objections from Russia. It seems like that could provide the perfect response to Russia: It mitigates one of their greatest strengths (nuclear arsenal). It shows concrete support to US allies in eastern Europe. It brings considerable pressure against Russia and hits a historical sore spot, but is still defensive in nature and therefore won’t be view as terribly escalatory by the world at large. It strikes a psychological blow against Russia’s historical reliance on nukes as their guarantor of safety. And it has the added bonus of protecting Europe against the threat of Iranian missiles.
The other option is a rapid expansion of NATO, which has much of the same benefits of the missile shield: ultimately defensive, but will still be viewed as threatening in Russia.
The primary reasons for not having done either of these in the past seems to have been due to deference to Russian objections, but that would make now the perfect time to implement them as punishment for blatantly hostile acts.
Is there a reason that I haven’t thought of for why neither of these options have been pursued?
By missile shield, do you mean the Bush Administration’s plan of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland, or do you mean the Obama Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach with land-based SM-3’s in Poland? If the former, there were many good reasons to scrap that plan, largely stemming from problems with the ground-based interceptors which still plague the program today. This plan was canceled in part to shift to a more proven system, the SM-3. The EPAA is still on track for land-based SM-3 deployment to Romania next year and Poland in 2018. The only thing that has changed with EPAA is that Phase 4 was canceled, which would have been a brand-new long-range interceptor. Is this what you want to consider reviving?
The problem with NATO expansion, as I have understood it, is that the existence of a “frozen” conflict or other outstanding territorial dispute generally has precluded membership for fear of dragging NATO militarily into what should be a bilateral political issue. The obvious candidates for NATO membership, besides a Ukrainian rump state, would be Georgia and Moldova, which both have these conflicts (not to mention the fact that Moldova is constitutionally neutral). A telling anecdote which supports this reasoning and very likely motivates current Russian policy in Ukraine is that in 2011, Medvedev, speaking to a Russian military unit, said that “If you…had faltered back in 2008, the geopolitical situation would be different now…And a number of countries which (NATO) tried to deliberately drag into the alliance, would have most likely already been part of it now.”
We have had strategic myopia towards Russia almost since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia is far more important in the looming 21st Century competition between the U.S. and China. Ukraine is clearly a part of Russia’s core interests and it makes no long-term strategic sense to poison the well for a generation over a country that has rarely been independent and is of, at best, tertiary interest to the U.S. and only secondarily important to Europe. The problem is that the appearance of weakness the U.S. has created for itself with Pentagon cuts, accumulation of debt and ill advised “red lines” elsewhere with no ultimate consequences makes non-intervention look more like an act of fecklessness than strategic restraint and long-term vision. Yet that should not drive the U.S. into making unwise decisions.
There are two options that I’ve thought about that no one seems to have brought up on this issue. One is the missile defense shield that the US tried setting up in Poland recently, but gave up on after objections from Russia. It seems like that could provide the perfect response to Russia: It mitigates one of their greatest strengths (nuclear arsenal). It shows concrete support to US allies in eastern Europe. It brings considerable pressure against Russia and hits a historical sore spot, but is still defensive in nature and therefore won’t be view as terribly escalatory by the world at large. It strikes a psychological blow against Russia’s historical reliance on nukes as their guarantor of safety. And it has the added bonus of protecting Europe against the threat of Iranian missiles.
The other option is a rapid expansion of NATO, which has much of the same benefits of the missile shield: ultimately defensive, but will still be viewed as threatening in Russia.
The primary reasons for not having done either of these in the past seems to have been due to deference to Russian objections, but that would make now the perfect time to implement them as punishment for blatantly hostile acts.
Is there a reason that I haven’t thought of for why neither of these options have been pursued?
Erik
By missile shield, do you mean the Bush Administration’s plan of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland, or do you mean the Obama Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach with land-based SM-3’s in Poland? If the former, there were many good reasons to scrap that plan, largely stemming from problems with the ground-based interceptors which still plague the program today. This plan was canceled in part to shift to a more proven system, the SM-3. The EPAA is still on track for land-based SM-3 deployment to Romania next year and Poland in 2018. The only thing that has changed with EPAA is that Phase 4 was canceled, which would have been a brand-new long-range interceptor. Is this what you want to consider reviving?
The problem with NATO expansion, as I have understood it, is that the existence of a “frozen” conflict or other outstanding territorial dispute generally has precluded membership for fear of dragging NATO militarily into what should be a bilateral political issue. The obvious candidates for NATO membership, besides a Ukrainian rump state, would be Georgia and Moldova, which both have these conflicts (not to mention the fact that Moldova is constitutionally neutral). A telling anecdote which supports this reasoning and very likely motivates current Russian policy in Ukraine is that in 2011, Medvedev, speaking to a Russian military unit, said that “If you…had faltered back in 2008, the geopolitical situation would be different now…And a number of countries which (NATO) tried to deliberately drag into the alliance, would have most likely already been part of it now.”
We have had strategic myopia towards Russia almost since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia is far more important in the looming 21st Century competition between the U.S. and China. Ukraine is clearly a part of Russia’s core interests and it makes no long-term strategic sense to poison the well for a generation over a country that has rarely been independent and is of, at best, tertiary interest to the U.S. and only secondarily important to Europe. The problem is that the appearance of weakness the U.S. has created for itself with Pentagon cuts, accumulation of debt and ill advised “red lines” elsewhere with no ultimate consequences makes non-intervention look more like an act of fecklessness than strategic restraint and long-term vision. Yet that should not drive the U.S. into making unwise decisions.
Campion 
Erik 
There are two options that I’ve thought about that no one seems to have brought up on this issue. One is the missile defense shield that the US tried setting up in Poland recently, but gave up on after objections from Russia. It seems like that could provide the perfect response to Russia: It mitigates one of their greatest strengths (nuclear arsenal). It shows concrete support to US allies in eastern Europe. It brings considerable pressure against Russia and hits a historical sore spot, but is still defensive in nature and therefore won’t be view as terribly escalatory by the world at large. It strikes a psychological blow against Russia’s historical reliance on nukes as their guarantor of safety. And it has the added bonus of protecting Europe against the threat of Iranian missiles.
The other option is a rapid expansion of NATO, which has much of the same benefits of the missile shield: ultimately defensive, but will still be viewed as threatening in Russia.
The primary reasons for not having done either of these in the past seems to have been due to deference to Russian objections, but that would make now the perfect time to implement them as punishment for blatantly hostile acts.
Is there a reason that I haven’t thought of for why neither of these options have been pursued?
By missile shield, do you mean the Bush Administration’s plan of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland, or do you mean the Obama Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach with land-based SM-3’s in Poland? If the former, there were many good reasons to scrap that plan, largely stemming from problems with the ground-based interceptors which still plague the program today. This plan was canceled in part to shift to a more proven system, the SM-3. The EPAA is still on track for land-based SM-3 deployment to Romania next year and Poland in 2018. The only thing that has changed with EPAA is that Phase 4 was canceled, which would have been a brand-new long-range interceptor. Is this what you want to consider reviving?
The problem with NATO expansion, as I have understood it, is that the existence of a “frozen” conflict or other outstanding territorial dispute generally has precluded membership for fear of dragging NATO militarily into what should be a bilateral political issue. The obvious candidates for NATO membership, besides a Ukrainian rump state, would be Georgia and Moldova, which both have these conflicts (not to mention the fact that Moldova is constitutionally neutral). A telling anecdote which supports this reasoning and very likely motivates current Russian policy in Ukraine is that in 2011, Medvedev, speaking to a Russian military unit, said that “If you…had faltered back in 2008, the geopolitical situation would be different now…And a number of countries which (NATO) tried to deliberately drag into the alliance, would have most likely already been part of it now.”
We have had strategic myopia towards Russia almost since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia is far more important in the looming 21st Century competition between the U.S. and China. Ukraine is clearly a part of Russia’s core interests and it makes no long-term strategic sense to poison the well for a generation over a country that has rarely been independent and is of, at best, tertiary interest to the U.S. and only secondarily important to Europe. The problem is that the appearance of weakness the U.S. has created for itself with Pentagon cuts, accumulation of debt and ill advised “red lines” elsewhere with no ultimate consequences makes non-intervention look more like an act of fecklessness than strategic restraint and long-term vision. Yet that should not drive the U.S. into making unwise decisions.