I recently delivered a speech at the International Institute of European Affairs in Dublin, Ireland. You can listen to it here or watch it here. The focus is on the implications of America’s “pivot” to Asia for U.S. foreign and national security policy broadly, and for Europe and the Middle East specifically. In the talk I expand on an argument made in a forthcoming book that America is “returning to realism” in its foreign policy priorities after two decades of dominance of the liberal and neoconservative consensus in Washington, D.C. In the talk, I argue that the pivot is a logical shift in US priorities but that it will only succeed if it is done well in Asia employing a range of cooperative tools and hedging via military influence; if America can successfully realign and handover lead responsibility for non-collective defense missions in Europe via NATO, America’s role around the Persian Gulf is significantly narrowed and peripheral wars like Syria are avoided, and if America invests in the domestic sources of its power to make the United States more competitive for the long-haul. The concept is right and consistent with a return to a more traditional balance between realism and idealist visions of America’s role in the world – but that failure in any one of these key elements risks undermining this fundamental and essential policy shift. If America cannot deliver on its announced strategy – which requires substantially realigning budgets and deeply entrenched thinking in Washington, D.C., then the pivot will be at risk, ceding major gains to future competitors.
Sean Kay, Ph.D. is Director of the Arneson Institute for Practical Politics and Public Affairs, and also Robson Professor of Politics and International Studies Chair at Ohio Wesleyan University. He is the author of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace.
Photo Credit: Dainis Matisons and Yanni Koutsomitis
Stan Sloan 
My good friend Sean Kay has put together a concept that advocates a major realignment of US security priorities and efforts. I applaud his advocacy of increased investment in key domestic sectors that underlie future American power. As much as I respect the work that he has put into the effort developing his concept, I am afraid that his approach has some major flaws. The most important flaw is his recommendation that the United States abandon a leading role in NATO. Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents, for the United States, a relatively small investment in maintenance of the only non-bilateral US treaty relationship that has any residual value. There is no such alliance in Asia, and there will not be for the foreseeable future, given the political histories and contemporary dynamics of the region. Even our major Asian allies, including Japan, Australia and New Zealand, recognize the importance to their security of continued US leadership in NATO. They know that, without the alliance base in Europe, the United States is weaker in Asia. It therefore would be UN-REALISTIC to believe that the United States can increase its influence and leadership in Asia while it diminishes the most important part of its alliance strengths in Europe. I am skeptical about making major new investments in the US military presence in Asia because of the potential destabilizing effects of such investments. At the same time, I support sensible economies in the US presence in Europe and the Middle East, all within the framework of realistically understanding that the United States cannot escape from involvement in either region if it wishes to help maintain a stable international environment.