Last Thursday I invited Emile Simpson and Kathleen McInnis to join me at the American Bar at the Savoy Hotel in London to talk about Emile’s book, “War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics.” After navigating the impressive drinks menu (priorities), we had a great discussion about Afghanistan, COIN, and the changing face of warfare. Have a listen!
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Photo Credit: Thomas Hawk
Ton Quiggin 
Just a thought, but the US Army/Marines had a series of excellent documents written on COIN. They were produced as a result of the Vietnam War.
Unfortunately, the great minds of the day were more focussed on “getting back to the Fulda Gap” than they were in learning how to win small wars. As a result, much of the knowledge won by bitter experience was simply tossed out. Additionally, the US military had developed an excellent intelligence capability in interrogations. Useful intel with high levels of confidence was produced without torture. This brilliant skill was also lost….. When the wars in Iraq/Afghanistan began, it was clear to many how badly these skills were needed and how totally they had been lost.
By contrast, a Danish colleague of mine was in the FATA area of Pakistan in early 2007. He was shocked when his local host (a tribal malik) pulled out some British books written about the war in Afghanistan. The books had been printed between 1870 and 1900. While we tend to dismiss some of these folks as “ignorant tribesmen” they did appear to be looking at the historical experience of the Brit Army to see what they could learn about current conflict. Funny that!
Simpson’s on top of his subject, McInnis mostly mouthed truisms, “ya know” . . .
Still the basic assumption which never came up was whether it was even possible to establish, or rather impose, our concept of a “state” in Afghanistan primarily through military means?
The original war aim was to destroy Al Qaida’s base in Afghanistan which was a rational military goal, but then this morphed into ““Our goal in Afghanistan is to help the people of that country defeat the terrorists and establish a stable, moderate, democratic state that respects the rights of its citizens, governs its territory effectively, and is a reliable ally in this war against extremists and terrorists” (GWB, 15.02.07). That is we went from a coherent strategic use of military means to a strategically irrational goal based on dubious assumptions of US/Western exceptionalism (“Freedom is on the march!”). This due to the demands of US domestic politics which continues, since as long as NATO remains operationally involved we can avoid the reality that the war at the strategic level has already been decided . . .
Perhaps far worse than simply another lost war, is the corrupting influence these irrational goals have had on our government institutions with the institutionalization of the War on Terror . . .
Seyditz89: You have aced the discussion. The original achievable military goal in Afghanistan was met in Dec 2001/Jan 2002. Since then, it has not been clear what goal is being sought other than “state building.”
If the goal was state building, then choosing to install and support Karzai runs directly contrary to that goal. He is not liked, feared or respected by the local population and he cannot be the foundation of any political project.
Tom Quiggin-
Thanks for the kind words, but don’t get me wrong. I really like Emile Simpson and think he’s a gifted strategic theorist, but even in his book he makes several highly questionable assumptions and links concepts that don’t quite fit together upon reflection. As to NATO involvement in Afghanistan, it is US politics, not the Afghan situation, which drives the whole shambles. In fact the whole War on Terror narrative (using Simpson’s approach which he doesn’t apply in this case) is quite fragile and riddled with dubious assumptions . . .