Admiral Xiao Jinguang was the first commander of the PRC’s navy. He was in charge of the Navy from 1950 to 1980–a period even longer than Sergei Gorshkov (1956-1985). Xiao survived various purges, the machinations of Lin Biao (before Lin himself fell from power), and the Cultural Revolution. At one point, he was attacked, and Mao himself defended him, declaring that, so long as he was alive, no one else would run the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This despite being a ground forces general during the Chinese Civil War. Also, despite being a ground pounder, Xiao founded the Dalian naval academy, one of the key naval professional military education institutions, and also helped run the program that developed China’s first nuclear submarine.
While much has been made of Liu Huaqing as China’s answer to Mahan (Liu spent more time actually in the navy, and also propounded China building aircraft carriers), one wonders what impact Xiao had?
Which raises the larger question: What impact have long-lived commanders had on institutional development in various militaries? Admiral Hyman Rickover clearly influenced nuclear power development in the USN, and Gorshkov affected Soviet naval development. But how sustained were these efforts, once these giants disappear?
Dean Cheng is the Heritage Foundation’s research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs.
Photo Credit: Petty Officer 2nd Class Ron Shackelford, U.S. Navy
Alexander B 
I’m not sure what metrics one would use for such questions. That said, the influence of General Margelov on the Soviet Airborne forces continued long into post-Soviet period, long long after he was dead and gone.
I think an interesting, specific answer to this question might be the bulwark of what the world considers the ultimate conventional weapon and that is the aircraft carrier.
Given that this system and the entire engagement model was developed during WWII (ADMs King, Halsey and Nimitz), I think as their institutional influence fades (which happens to any organization at the point it chooses to adapt and evolve), we are seeing the next evolution in conventional warfare in the form of the “drone” (be it Globalhawk, Scan Eagle or what have you). While the aircraft carrier is considered the gold standard of power projection, I think that is slowly evolving to the extent that air (and one can argue space-based) dominance in the sense of uninhibited aerial coverage (surveillance and strike) is the next standard. Consider how many countries are pursing (successfully) aircraft carrier programs and how many countries are pursing drone programs as a means of parity and projection. The one flaw with this observation is humanitarian assistance operations in which case logistics dictates the ability to respond (heavy air lifts and sea transportation).
Regardless of the branch of service and considering the DOD is looking to downsize and cut costs (SECDEF Hagel has mentioned that he is considering a force reduction of three aircraft carriers), I think the WWII model of thinking is coming to a close, or adapting such that we will no longer recognize it in the next 15 years.